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Abstract: One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is
that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers
might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judge-
ment and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the
assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate
if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are diﬀerent from those of laborers
by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a
fast-growing, small-manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory,
we ﬁnd that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers.
These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends
support to the idea that risk preferences are an important determinant of se-
lection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of ﬁnancial
decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures
and experimental methods.
* This work was completed while Castillo and Petrie were on leave at University
of Pittsburgh. We are grateful to Lise Vesterlund and the Economics Department
for their hospitality and to Lise Vesterlund for her helpful comments.1. Introduction
A basic intuition in economics is that trade is not possible without het-
erogeneity of preferences or assets and that markets are best equipped to
allocate resources and abilities to tasks. This paper takes this intuition to
task by looking at risk. We investigate if risk preferences are heterogeneous
in the ﬁeld and if markets allocate people to tasks based on their risk prefer-
ences. We do this by implementing an artefactual ﬁeld experiment (Harrison
and List, 2004) on a random sample of managers in a fast-growing economic
cluster.
The idea that markets need agents that are willing to take risks in order to
develop dates back, at least, to Cantillon (1732). Later authors, like Knight
(1921) and Hayek (1969), note that entrepreneurs are needed to bear any ex-
tra gains and losses from the eﬃcient allocation of resources. However, there
is no universal agreement that entrepreneurs must be willing to bear more
risks. Schumpeter (1950), for instance, argues that, as markets develop, it is
ﬁnancial systems that should bear risks and not particular agents. However,
in the presence of information asymmetries, there is no guarantee that ﬁnan-
cial markets will be able to absorb all risk. Perhaps the area of economics
where the role of risk preferences is most explicit is that of contract theory.
Standard treatments of the principal-agent model (Kreps, 1990) show that
principals are able to oﬀer incentive-compatible contracts that exploit the
relative risk aversion of principals and agents. In this paper, we empirically
investigate this asymmetry of risk.
There is little empirical evidence corroborating the basic assumption that
principals are less risk averse than agents. Previous work has used hypothet-
ical risky investment questions or situational questions to measure risk, and
comparisons have been across the general population and across various sec-
tors. The evidence is mixed. In early work, using mailed surveys to assess risk
propensity, Brockhaus (1980) and Masters and Meier (1988) ﬁnd no diﬀer-
1ence between owners and managers. Cramer, Hartog, Jonker and Van Praag
(2002) ﬁnd a link between an ex-post hypothetical lottery risk measure and
entrepreneurial choice at some previous point in a person’s life, however, they
caution that their results are not causal. Ekelund, Johansson, Jarvelin and
Lichtermann (2005) use a psychological measure of "fear of uncertainty" to
measure risk. They ﬁnd a direct link between their risk measure and being
self-employed. More generally, Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huﬀman and Sunde
(2006) use a hypothetical risky investment question to measure risk and ﬁnd
a correlation between risk and variance in earnings across occupations.
A challenge in testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity of preferences is
that we rarely observe people in these conditions. To wit, it is not clear
that simple comparisons between people in managerial and non-managerial
positions will provide the appropriate contrast. Indeed, those in managerial
positions are likely to be more educated but otherwise similar to others. Also,
relating variance in income and risk aversion across various sectors may pick
up unexplained variation in wages across sectors that may be correlated with
risk.
To avoid these problems, we collect experimental data on risk preferences
in a random sample of managers of micro-enterprises in a fast-growing eco-
nomic cluster. All ﬁr m si nt h i sc l u s t e ra r ei n v o l v e di ns m a l lm a n u f a c t u r i n g
and are geographically close. We exploit the fact that many ﬁrms in this
sector are managed by owners (entrepreneurs), but many others are man-
aged by agents. Owner-managers and agent-managers face similar risks and
market conditions. Moreover, in this context, business activity takes place
with limited ﬁnancial intermediation, so one expects risk preferences to be
important. All this makes our sample ideal to compare the preferences of en-
trepreneurs with that of agents. If people select into activities according to
their preferences, we should expect that those managing their own enterprises
will be less risk averse than agents.
Indeed, we ﬁnd strong evidence that agents are more risk averse than
2owners as theory suggests. In our experiments, agent-managers are more
conservative in paid lotteries over gains as well as in lotteries over gains and
losses. We test if our results are robust to the inclusion of covariate data,
and we ﬁnd that our basic result changes little. People sort into activities
according to risk preferences. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that experimental
data correlates with important ﬁnancial decisions. This provides evidence
of the usefulness of experimental methods in understanding basic economic
hypotheses and also of the importance of carefully selecting samples to make
these hypotheses testable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample and
experimental methods. Section 3 presents basic experimental results and its
relationship with economic decisions. Section 4 concludes.
2. Sample Selection and Design
The study was conducted in Gamarra, a fast-growing economic cluster in
Lima, Peru. Gamarra is akin to the Garment District in New York; it is a
sector full of ﬁrms involved in small-scale manufacturing and trade. Most of
Gamarra’s entrepreneurs are migrants that started their business outside the
formal ﬁnancial system. Until the early nineties, this sector has faced little
regulation or support, making it a unique laboratory of how market forces
work.1
Gamarra is a 12-square block area in Lima, Peru. It emerged in the
1960’s as an area where migrants started small textile businesses to supply
the growing garment industry. Since its inception, the area has attracted
migrants and entrepreneurs for its agglomeration economies. Now, the area
hosts thousands of small ﬁrms engaged in small manufacturing (i.e. retail,
consumption and wholesale goods) and trade. Because of their small size,
ﬁrms are capable of quickly adapting production to the needs of the market.
1In 1995, a new simpliﬁed tax system was implemented to make it possible for small
business to pay taxes. Further modiﬁcations were introduced in 2003.
3This make the area dynamic and attractive to those willing to take risks.
In order to secure a random sample of the population of businesses, ﬁrst,
a pre-census of all establishments was conducted. Then, a random sample of
establishments was selected. The manager of the establishment was surveyed
on the characteristics of the ﬁrm. This survey collected information on the
assets, age, size and ﬁnancial matters as well as informal business networks.
A separate, extensive survey was conducted to gather information on the
manager’s household. As part of the household survey, the manager was
asked a few lotteries questions. These lotteries were only asked of managers,
many of whom were owners of the ﬁrm as well. The experimental procedures
are explained further below.
Table 1 presents a summary of the population of managers and ﬁrms.
The data are restricted to ﬁrms managed by men because, of the 360 ﬁrms
interviewed, only 47 were managed by women. Also, of the ﬁrms managed
by women, 91% are also owners. Because of the small variation in agents and
owners among women, we focus our analysis on the male-managed ﬁrms. All
the results in the paper hold, however, if women are included.2
Looking at Table 1, sixty percent of ﬁrms are managed by their owners.
Eighty-eight percent of managers are married, 85 percent ﬁnished high school
a n d2 3p e r c e n th a v eac o l l e g ed e g r e e .T h ea v e r a g ea g ei s4 3y e a r s .T h et a b l e
shows that the households of managers are not rich by Peruvian standards,
where average, annual per-capita income at the time of the study was 18,000
soles. They are not poor either. They have an annual per capita income
three times higher than the poverty line of 6.6 soles a day.3
2One notable diﬀerence between men and women is their risk aversion. Women are
more risk loving than men. This issue, however, is addressed in another paper (Castillo,
Petrie, Torero, 2007).
3Two dollars a day (6.6 soles) is one poverty line measure. This income equates to
around 2,400 soles a year at the time of the survey (US$1 = 3.3 soles).
4Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - Gamarra - Means
Managers
Owner (percent) 60.38 (3.0)
Married (percent) 88.45 (5.0)
High School (percent) 84.98 (2.0)
College (percent) 23.32 (2.0)
Age (years) 43.40 (0.68)
Annual Per Cap. Income (,000) - soles 8.89 (0.62)
Annual Per Cap. Inc. - Owner (,000) - soles 9.76 (0.97)
Annual Per Cap. Inc. - Non Owner (,000) - soles 7.57 (0.54)
Household Size 3.89 (0.10)
Firms
Number of Workers 3.31 (0.14)
Age of Firm (years) 5.07 (0.30)
Monthly Income (,000) - soles 15.30 (0.67)
Proﬁt (percent) 61.74 (6.74)
Total Capital (,000) - soles 49.32 (9.70)
Observations 313
standard errors in parentheses, exchange rate (3.3 soles=US$1)
The average size of the ﬁrm is 3.3 members, with a maximum size of 26
in our sample. Most ﬁrms are relative young, 5.1 years old on average, with
the youngest being less than a year and the oldest being 32 years old. The
ﬁrms have an average income slightly below US$5000 per year and the value
of assets is around US$14,000. In an typical month, the average proﬁtp e r
ﬁrm is 62 cent per dollar.
To elicit risk preferences, all managers were asked to respond to a series
of simple lotteries. The lotteries are a simpliﬁed version of the lotteries
ﬁrst used by Binswanger (1980). Managers were asked to choose one of
ﬁve risky prospects that gave a high and low payoﬀ with equal probability.
The lotteries are listed in Table 2. They were constructed by either adding
30 × k or subtracting 10 × k, k =1 ,...,4, to an initial high and low payoﬀ
5of (50,50) or (0,0).T h e ﬁrst set of lotteries therefore were over gains and
the second over gains and losses. The units of the lottery were cents of the
local currency.4 Managers made their decision over gains, then over gains
and losses. Lotteries were resolved by ﬂipping a coin. Managers were paid
in cash the sum of their earnings from the gain and gain-loss lotteries.
3. Results
3.1. Basic Results
This section discusses the results of our experiment. Table 2 presents
the frequency with which each lottery was chosen and the average decisions
made according to several socio-economic variables. Forty-nine managers
did not answer the lottery question. There does not appear to be selection
on observables. While richer households are more likely answer the lottery
question, owners are no more likely than non-owners to answer. There are
no other diﬀerences (i.e. by age, education, etc.).
The top panel of Table 2 shows that choices are distributed evenly in the
lottery over gains. The lottery over gains and losses, however, generates a
signiﬁcantly larger proportion of safe choices.5 The signiﬁcant increase in
risk aversion in the lotteries over gains and losses is as pronounced as the
shift towards safe bets reported by Binswanger (1980, 1981) and Holt and
Laury (2002) in lotteries with large stakes versus lotteries with small stakes.
That behavior across lotteries varies in an intuitive way gives us conﬁ-
dence that subjects took them seriously despite the small stakes. This would
seem to be at odds with the assumption that the utility function for money
is arbitrarily close to linear over small amounts of money. However, Holt and
Laury (2002) show signiﬁcant evidence of risk aversion even when lotteries
use small stakes and that risk aversion increases as payoﬀs are scaled up.
4One hundred cents, or 1 sol, could buy a person lunch in Gamarra.
5The χ2(4) test of diﬀerence in distributions is 39.34 (p-value < 0.000).
6They also show that it is possible to ﬁnd evidence of risk aversion over small
stakes without implying impossibly high levels of risk aversion over large
stakes.
Table 2. Experimental Data
Distribution of Choices
Gains Gains & Losses
High & Low Payoﬀ Frequency High & Low Payoﬀ Frequency
(50,50) 18.56 (0,0) 31.44
(80,40) 23.86 (30,-10) 29.19
(110,30) 20.45 (60,-20) 20.45
(140,20) 18.18 (90,-30) 13.26
(170,10) 18.94 (120,-40) 5.68
Observations 264 Observations 264
Average Responses
Gains Gains & Losses
Variable No Yes t-test (p-value) No Yes t-test (p-value)
Owner 2.70 3.12 -2.45 (0.02) 2.15 2.44 -1.93 (0.05)
40 years or older 2.96 2.94 0.11 (0.91) 2.45 2.21 1.60 (0.11)
Above Median Income 2.86 3.05 -1.11 (0.27) 2.23 2.42 -1.22 (0.22)
High School 2.48 3.04 -2.37 (0.02) 2.03 2.38 -1.72 (0.09)
Also, our lotteries provide a direct test of the hypothesis of constant
absolute risk aversion. By design, the payoﬀs of both lotteries diﬀer only by
a constant (50). The deﬁnition of constant absolute risk aversion implies,
therefore, we should not expect any change in behavior across lotteries. We
conclude then that managers possess either decreasing absolute risk aversion
or suﬀer from loss aversion.6
The second panel of Table 2 compares risk preferences across diﬀerent
segments of the population of managers. The ﬁrst 3 columns of the bottom
panel present comparisons for the lotteries over gains and the last 3 columns
6Given the small stakes of our lotteries, the hypothesis of loss aversion seems more
plausible.
7present comparisons for the lotteries over gains and losses. We ﬁnd that
owners are signiﬁcantly less risk averse than managers. This is true in both
lotteries. On average, the decision of an owner-manager is 19 percent higher
than of an agent-manager. While we ﬁnd diﬀerences across other populations,
evidence on other personal or household characteristics is less robust.
Table 3 presents regression analysis of individual decisions. The availabil-
ity of survey data on managers and their households allow us to test whether
the diﬀerence in behavior is just a reﬂection of diﬀerent socio-economic back-
grounds. Since choices are ordered by risk, we use an ordered logit regression.
The regressions control for education, age, income, family size and a poly-
choric index (Angeles and Kolenikov, 2004) of household assets and durable
goods. The results are unchanged if additional controls are added or if we
control by type of business (i.e. retail, consumption, or wholesale).7
Table 3 conﬁrms that the eﬀect of ownership remains even when con-
trolling for additional covariates. Our results suggest that entrepreneurs
are diﬀerent from other managers. Even controlling for income and wealth,
owners than manage their own ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less risk averse than
managers who do the same job but for others. This is remarkable given that
our sampling procedure eliminates many of the potential confounding eﬀects
by holding occupation and market conditions constant. Our results are im-
portant because they conﬁrm economists’ fundamental views of markets and
social interactions. Entrepreneurs are more tolerant to risk and agents are
more risk averse than principals.
7For instance, the results are similar if we add controls for experience and household
age composition among others.
8Table 3. Ordered Logit Regressions on Lottery Choices
Gains G&L Gains G&L
Owner 0.602** 0.602** 0.463* 0.452*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.052) (0.059)
High School 1.082*** 1.113*** 0.782** 0.664*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.066)
College -0.582** -0.576** -0.311 -0.371
(0.037) (0.041) (0.257) (0.181)
Age (years) 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.006
(0.958) (0.976) (0.943) (0.928)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.821) (0.802) (0.857) (0.908)
Log of Household Income 0.259* 0.275* 0.183 0.063
(0.079) (0.095) (0.207) (0.700)
Family Size -0.112 -0.120* -0.031 -0.026
(0.115) (0.093) (0.664) (0.717)
Index of Household Characteristics 0.089 0.059
(0.503) (0.644)
Index of Household Assets -0.068 0.170
(0.556) (0.137)
Log-Likelihood -411.38 -411.05 -384.04 -382.61
N 264 264 264 264
p-values in parentheses, * p-value < .1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01
Evidence that simple lotteries capture diﬀerences in preferences across the
population is mixed.8 Eckel and Grossman (2007) use an instrument similar
to ours and provide evidence that some instruments might be insensitive to
characteristics, not lotteries in general. Clearly, if instruments only weakly
capture subjects’ preferences, it would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd eﬀects unless they
are really strong. In that sense, our sampling procedure, that builds on the
inﬂuence of risk preference on sorting, would be better at detecting diﬀerence
8For instance, Holt and Laury (2002) ﬁnd that risk aversion is weakly related or not at
all with gender, major, or race. Dave, Eckel, Johnson and Rojas (2007) ﬁnd a correlation
between several risk measures and gender. Dohmen, Falk, Huﬀman, Schupp and Wagner
(2005) ﬁnd correlations between risk lotteries and gender, age and height. For an excellent
review of the literature on risk and gender, see Croson and Gneezy (2007).
9in the population.
We would also like to know if risk preferences elicited with lotteries and
actual economic outcomes are correlated. The evidence from the literature is
mixed. Some have found a correlation. For example, Binswanger (1980, 1981)
ﬁnds agricultural investment decisions related to risk measures. Jacobson
and Petrie (2007) ﬁnd no correlation between household savings decisions
and risk measures. We speculate that these inconclusive results may be due
to the types of decisions (i.e. household versus business) to which these risk
preferences are being related. In the next section, we look at the correlation
between our risk measures and household and business decisions.
3.2. Risk Preferences and Economic Decisions
A potential concern is that experimental data, while strongly correlated
with personal characteristics, is uncorrelated with important economic deci-
sions.9 Table 4 presents Tobit regressions on the amount saved and on the
amount of loans held. The ﬁrst decision is a household ﬁnancial decision, and
the second is a ﬁrm ﬁnancial decision. All regressions control for household
and ﬁrm characteristics and for whether the manager is the owner or not.
Finally, we include the decisions made by the manager in either the lottery
over gains or the lottery over gains and losses.
We ﬁnd that while decisions in the experiments are weakly and insigniﬁ-
cantly correlated with household savings, lotteries are positively and signif-
icantly correlated with the amount of credit held by the ﬁrm. This result
is to be expected since household decisions are not solely a function of the
manager’s preferences but, potentially, also of other household members’
preferences. Credit decisions, on the other hand, are under the control of
managers. This result reassures us of the external validity of experimental
methods and that our measures actually explain decisions. We have already
9Of course, preferences may not be correlated with economic decisions because of het-
erogeneous expectations. We do not explore that here.
10established that risk preference are partially captured by being an owner.
So, the eﬀect measured in this regression is likely to underestimate the total
eﬀect of risk preferences on economic decisions.
11Table 4. Tobit Regressions on Financial Decisions
Savings (,000) Loans (,000)
Choice in Gain Lottery 1.093 1.069
(0.114) (0.254)
Choice in Gain & Loss Lottery 0.293 1.863*
(0.703) (0.065)
Owner 1.583 2.157 10.904*** 10.702***
(0.449) (0.312) (0.001) (0.001)
High School -0.566 -0.232 -4.149 -3.709
(0.864) (0.945) (0.257) (0.298)
College 2.460 1.938 4.087 3.847
(0.247) (0.369) (0.181) (0.199)
Age (years) 0.423 0.529 2.112** 2.148**
(0.564) (0.485) (0.041) (0.036)
Age Square -0.007 -0.008 -0.024** -0.025**
(0.393) (0.346) (0.036) (0.033)
Log of Household Income 1.534 1.809 4.556** 4.765**
(0.265) (0.205) (0.020) (0.014)
Family Size -0.646 -0.807* -0.230 -0.152
(0.332) (0.225) (0.782) (0.854)
Index of Household Characteristics -1.734 -1.672 -0.003 -0.054
(0.132) (0.158) (0.998) (0.972)
Index of Household Assets 3.472*** 3.489*** -1.807 -2.105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.130)
Firm Age (Months) -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 -0.014
(0.565) (0.639) (0.444) (0.502)
Number of Workers 0.545* 0.593* 0.247 0.197
(0.074) (0.061) (0.566) (0.644)
Firms is Registered 4.236 4.495 -3.479 -3.287
(0.364) (0.355) (0.415) (0.441)
Implicit Interest Rate (00) 0.662 0.800 0.222* 0.218*
(0.753) (0.712) 0.077 (0.078)
Constant -38.731* -42.225* -105.684*** -110.779***
(0.067) (0.053) (0.001) (0.001)
Log-Likelihood -158.68 -159.86 -266.96 -265.86
Observations 264 264 264 264
p-values in parentheses, * p-value < .1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01
12The estimates indicate that, conditional on taking a loan, the marginal ef-
fect of one higher choice in the lottery over gains would double the amount of
credit held by the ﬁrm. One higher choice in the lottery over gains and losses
would triple the amount of credit held. This is true even controlling for per-
sonal and ﬁrm characteristics.10 This is important because our experiments
not only detect important diﬀerences in the preferences of the population,
but also identify statistically and economically signiﬁcant consequence of risk
preference on decisions. This suggests that previous results that show that
risk experiments are either insensitive to preferences or uninformative about
decision making might partially be due to the experimental instrument and
sample choice. Indeed, the issue of heterogeneity of beliefs is less of a problem
in our sample due to the fact that subjects in our experiment face similar
market conditions.
4. Conclusions
We investigate whether risk preferences of economic agents are important
in market economies and explain sorting into jobs. Using a simple experimen-
tal procedure, we measure risk preferences in a random sample of business
m a n a g e r s .A l lt h em a n a g e r sw o r ki nad y n a m i cs m a l lm a n u f a c t u r i n gc l u s t e r ,
share similar socio-economic backgrounds, face similar market conditions,
but diﬀer in their ownership of a business. Our design reduces many of the
confounding eﬀects encountered in other studies of risk and increases the
external validity of our results.
We ﬁnd two key results. First, managers that own the ﬁrm where they
work are signiﬁcantly less risk averse than managers that do not own the
ﬁrm. This result is robust to the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics
of managers and type of manufacturing. This supports the theoretical as-
sumption that agents are more risk averse than principals. Second, our study
10Choices in the lotteries are correlated with other ﬁnancial decisions like having par-
ticipated in credit groups or holding credit cards.
13gives strong support to the basic economic intuition that entrepreneurs are
diﬀerent and markets encourage them to sort into activities that require deal-
ing with signiﬁcant risks. Our measures of risk aversion are correlated with
business ﬁnancial decisions made by the manager.
Our study gives support to the importance of ﬁeld experiments, as ar-
ticulated by Harrison and List (2004). Taking experimental methods to the
population of interest and sampling from a population where confounding
eﬀects are less likely to be an issue seem to be important. Experimental
methods can not only be a powerful tool to detect diﬀerences in preferences,
but they can also detect evidence of sorting. The distribution of preferences
across principals and agents in a business sector seems to be consistent with
economic theory.
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